Portland State University

PDXScholar
University Honors Theses

University Honors College

2016

The Effects of the ACA on Actuarial Pricing: How the
Work of Health Actuaries Has Changed Post-ACA
Alex M.S. George
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
George, Alex M.S., "The Effects of the ACA on Actuarial Pricing: How the Work of Health Actuaries Has
Changed Post-ACA" (2016). University Honors Theses. Paper 218.
https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.215

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

The Effects of the ACA on Actuarial Pricing:
How the Work of Health Actuaries Has Changed Post-ACA

by
Alex M.S. George

An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the
requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Science
in
University Honors
and
Mathematics

Thesis Adviser
Robert L. Fountain, Ph.D.

Portland State University
2016

George 2

Research Questions:
What are the key provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
that have impacted the pricing considerations of health actuaries and the consumers of
healthcare in the individual and small group markets in the United States? Can the
effects of the age and tobacco related rating restrictions be quantified?

Introduction
In the United States, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or
ACA) drastically altered the health insurance industry. Insurers are no longer able to
deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on an individual’s medical history. In
order to “more evenly spread the financial risk borne by issuers and help stabilize
premiums,” risk-sharing provisions dubbed the “3 R’s” (risk adjustment, risk corridors,
and reinsurance) were instituted in the individual and small group market (“Summary
Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment
Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). With these recent events in mind, there are two
objectives for this research exercise. Firstly, there will be a discussion of the various
changes brought about by the ACA that impact the considerations of actuaries pricing
individual and small group medical insurance and the consumers of healthcare in the
United States. After having established the implications of these recent changes, health
insurance premium data from the Washington Office of the Insurance Commissioner will
be used to analyze the effects of specific health insurance rating restrictions
implemented by the ACA.
In order to comprehend the Affordable Care Act’s relevance to actuaries, it is
critical to first understand the role of actuaries in the health insurance industry.
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Actuaries are sometimes described as financial engineers responsible for assessing risk
and ensuring the financial security of their organization. Their work includes, but is not
limited to analyzing data, setting reserves, developing predictive models, and
forecasting future claims and premiums. These tasks are impacted by risk adjustment,
reinsurance, and risk corridors along with many other provisions and changes made by
the Affordable Care Act. As such, it is paramount that they understand what changes
have been made and how they alter traditional actuarial methods and strategies. The
finer details of these changes will be discussed in great detail in the following analysis,
but for the purposes of this introduction, I will provide a list of the various topics for the
research exercise. They are as follows: guaranteed issue, family 3-child cap for
individual market rating, the health insurance marketplace, actuarial value, essential
health benefits, age bands and tobacco usage, reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk
corridors. After having addressed these topics, I will be conducting a statistical analysis
to provide quantitative evidence of how actuaries have been affected by the
aforementioned rating restrictions including age bands and tobacco usage related
restrictions.

Significant Changes Impacting Healthcare Providers
Introduction
Prior to the implementation of the ACA, insurers and their actuaries had
significantly more freedom in how they priced their medical insurance. In theory,
premiums were based primarily on the expected costs associated with the risks of their
enrollees. However, with the advent of certain legislation including age bands, tobaccousage related pricing restrictions, risk adjustment, etc., actuaries are not only more
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limited in how they can price their insurance, but are additionally required to consider
more closely the decisions being made by their competitors in the market. The following
pages will seek to shed light on these topics and others to highlight how both actuaries
and consumers of healthcare have been affected by these changes.
Guaranteed Issue
Guaranteed issue is likely the most tangible change for health insurance
consumers in the individual market brought about by the Affordable Care Act. As of
2014, the ACA prevents the denial of medical insurance coverage to an individual
because of a preexisting condition. In the past, medical insurance providers could
refuse coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions. Insurers could also elect to
extend coverage to these individuals with the caveat of charging a higher premium. The
practice of using medical or health information to assess an applicant’s eligibility for
medical insurance is known as medical underwriting. Under the ACA, this practice has
been eliminated in the individual marketplace. This means that insurers must offer
coverage to individuals (and families) regardless of their current medical state.
Additionally, individuals with conditions ranging from back pain to cancer cannot be
charged a higher premium based on their medical history (“Marketplace Health Plans
Cover Pre-Existing Conditions”).
The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and Medicaid are also unable
to refuse coverage or charge more because of an individual’s medical history. One
exception to guaranteed issue exists in regards to grandfathered individual health plans.
Note that grandfathered plans are plans that existed prior to March 24, 2010 and have
not had changes that reduced benefits substantially or increased costs for consumers.
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These plans are not required to cover preexisting conditions. If an individual is facing
the situation in which their insurer does not cover a preexisting condition, then they may
be inclined to switch insurance providers, and can elect to purchase a different health
insurance plan through a health insurance marketplace (also known as a health
exchange) (“Marketplace Health Plans Cover Pre-Existing Conditions”). The health
insurance marketplace will be discussed further below.
Family 3-Child Cap for Individual Market Rating
Another change brought about by the ACA that clearly impacts health insurance
consumers is the implementation of a 3-child cap for individual market rating. The
official Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) technical summary imposes
“a cap of no more than three covered children under the age of 21 whose per member
rates are taken into account in determining the family premium” (“Overview: Final Rule
for Health Insurance Market Reforms”). What this means in practice is that the premium
for a family with more than three children under the age of 21 will only be based on the
price of insurance for three of the children under 21. For example, assume there were
two families with the same insurance coverage composed of identical age and gender
configurations and three children under the age of 21. Then assume one of the families
were to have a fourth child. Under this ACA ruling, the insurance premiums for the two
families would remain identical even after one family’s addition of the fourth child.
The Health Insurance Marketplace
The health insurance marketplace (also known as the health exchange) was
created with the intent to be “a resource where individuals, families, and small
businesses can: learn about their health coverage options; compare health insurance
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plans based on costs, benefits, and other important features; choose a plan; and enroll
in coverage” (“Health Insurance Marketplace”). The health insurance marketplace is
also the means by which individuals can apply for coverage through the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and Medicaid or apply for government subsidies for
their health insurance. Private insurers are permitted to sell health insurance plans on
the exchange as well, but in order to do so, the plans must meet certain requirements.
These requirements additionally apply to all private plans, including individual, small
group, large group, and self-insured plans in which employers contract administrative
services to a third party payer. The only exception is in the case of grandfathered plans,
which are not bound by these requirements (“Preventive Services Covered by Private
Health Plans under the Affordable Care Act”).
Among these requirements is a set of preventive services that must be covered
without charging a copayment or coinsurance. This list is long and varied, but examples
include mammograms, blood pressure screening, diet counseling, immunizations, and
vision screening for children (“Preventive Services Covered by Private Health Plans
under the Affordable Care Act”). Marketplace plans also have restrictions in regard to
maximum out-of-pocket costs. For 2014 the maximum out-of-pocket costs for an
individual plan and family plan were $6,350 and $12,700 respectively (Andrews). For
2015 the maximum out-of-pocket costs for an individual plan and family plan were
$6,600 and $13,200 (“Out-of-Pocket Maximum/limit”). Money paid in deductibles,
coinsurance, and copays all contribute to these limits, and once the limit has been
reached, the insurance company is responsible for 100% of the costs for covered care.
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These changes should benefit individuals purchasing non-grandfathered plans by
guaranteeing preventive benefits and limiting their out-of-pocket costs.
Actuarial Value
Actuarial value is defined as a measure of the “relative generosity” of the benefits
covered by a given health insurance plan. The actuarial value indicates the “average
share of medical spending that is paid by the plan, as opposed to being paid out-ofpocket by the consumer.” This value is given as a percentage, and takes into account
the plan’s cost-sharing features including copyaments, out-of-pocket maximums,
deductibles, and coinsurance. These actuarial values can be used to categorize plans
into different “metal” tiers. Bronze, silver, gold, and platinum plans have actuarial values
of 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% respectively. The government provides insurers a
calculator which can be used to determine the actuarial value of their plans. For those
enrolling in health insurance plans, it is critical to again note that the actuarial values or
metal tiers are intended to calculate the “average share of medical spending” paid by
the plan, and the true percentage can and will vary for plans within the same metal tier
(American Academy of Actuaries).
Essential Health Benefits
The concept of essential health benefits (abbreviated EHBs) was also introduced
to the health insurance industry through the Affordable Care Act. The ACA requires
non-grandfathered health plans to cover items and services from the following ten
benefit categories: “(1) ambulatory patient services, (2) emergency services, (3)
hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5) mental health and substance use
disorder services including health and behavioral health treatment, (6) prescription
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drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) laboratory services, (9)
preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric
services including oral and vision care.” These EHBs are to be “equal in scope to a
typical employer health plan.” EHBs are defined by state specific EHB-benchmark plans
(“Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans”). Note that this
allows for situations in which the essential health benefits are defined differently from
one state to the next.
Age Bands and Tobacco Usage
One unquestionably notable reform under the ACA relates to the implementation
of “age bands.” Providers are now limited to a 3:1 ratio between the premiums paid for
the most elderly members and the youngest adult members. Children have a single age
band spanning from 0 to 20 years of age. Adults have one-year age bands beginning at
age 21 and ending at age 63. There is also one final age band for all individuals 64 and
older. States were permitted to use a narrower age curve if they submitted relevant
information to the government by March 29, 2013. Otherwise they would be required to
use the age curve seen below (“Summary Report on Transitional Reinsurance
Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment”).
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Table 1
Age Bands
Age

Premium
Ratio

Age

Premium
Ratio

Age

Premium
Ratio

0-20

0.635

35

1.222

50

1.786

21

1.000

36

1.230

51

1.865

22

1.000

37

1.238

52

1.952

23

1.000

38

1.246

53

2.040

24

1.000

39

1.262

54

2.135

25

1.004

40

1.278

55

2.230

26

1.024

41

1.302

56

2.333

27

1.048

42

1.325

57

2.437

28

1.087

43

1.357

58

2.548

29

1.119

44

1.397

59

2.603

30

1.135

45

1.444

60

2.714

31

1.159

46

1.500

61

2.810

32

1.183

47

1.563

62

2.873

33

1.198

48

1.635

63

2.952

34

1.214

49

1.706

64 and Older

3.000

Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Summary Report on Transitional
Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment Transfers for the 2014 Benefit
Year.” 30 June 2015. Web. 11 Jan. 2016.
In tandem with the above table, rates for tobacco users are allowed to vary no
more than 1.5:1 for any one age group. For example, a tobacco using individual 64
years and older may only be charged up to 4.5 times more than a 21 year-old who does
not use tobacco. Tobacco use is defined as “the use of a tobacco product or products
four or more times per week within no longer than the past 6 months by legal users of
tobacco products and includes all tobacco products.” States and issuers are also
permitted to implement a stricter tobacco rating factor within 1:1 and 1.5:1 should they
choose to do so (“Overview: Final Rule for Health Insurance Market Reforms”).
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Introduction to the 3 R’s
As a result of the above changes, the Affordable Care Act included three
provisions collectively referred to as premium stabilization programs, which are more
commonly known as the “3 R’s.” The “3 R’s” refer to reinsurance, risk adjustment, and
risk corridors. The ultimate goal of these premium stabilization programs is to support
the ACA’s mission to provide consumers with affordable health insurance coverage by
reducing incentives for health insurers to avoid enrolling sicker people and stabilizing
premiums in the individual and small group health insurance markets (“Premium
Stabilization Programs”). Reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment will be
discussed further in the following paragraphs.
Reinsurance
The concept of reinsurance is not new in the health insurance industry.
Reinsurance is a type of an insurance offered to insurers as a means of mitigating large
losses. The “Transitional Reinsurance Program” was implemented by the ACA to
“stabilize premiums in the individual market inside and outside of the Marketplace” (“The
Transitional Reinsurance Program - Reinsurance Contributions”). Note that reinsurance
payments are only made for claims on members in non-grandfathered individual plans.
Since an individual can no longer be denied coverage because of a preexisting
condition, insurance companies face higher risk pools than in the past, and reinsurance
can dampen the effects of larger claims. The concept is that this “transitional” (meaning
temporary) program works to stabilize premiums by dissuading insurers from inflating
premiums to protect themselves from the new risk pool. The intent is that by 2017
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(when the reinsurance program ends), insurers should have better data to use when
pricing their products.
For the 2014 benefit year, the original attachment point, reinsurance cap, and
coinsurance rate were $60,000, $250,000, and 80% respectively. The attachment point
and coinsurance rate were later changed to $45,000 and 100% respectively (“Summary
Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment
Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). The original attachment point for 2015 was
$70,000, but it was later changed to $45,000. The reinsurance cap for 2015 was
$250,000 with a coinsurance rate of 50% (as of 6/18/15). The proposed 2016
reinsurance attachment point and reinsurance cap are $90,000 and $250,000
respectively with a coinsurance rate of 50% (Perlman, Norris, Leida). As in years past, if
reinsurance contributions exceed reinsurance payments, the coinsurance may be
changed to ensure that the contributions collected are expended (Cigna). The table
(Table 2) and formula below illustrate how the reinsurance payment is calculated where
𝑥 is the sum of an individual’s claims for the year, 𝐴 is the attachment point, 𝐵 is the
reinsurance cap, 𝐶 is the coinsurance rate as a percentage, and 𝑓(𝑥) equals the
reinsurance payment to the insurer for the given individual.
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Table 2
Reinsurance Parameters
Year

Attachment
Point

Reinsurance
Cap

Coinsurance

Fee

2014

$45,000

$250,000

100%

$63

2015
2016

$45,000
$90,000

$250,000
$250,000

50%
50%

$44
$27

Source: Perlman, Daniel, Doug Norris, and Hans Leida. “Transitional Reinsurance at
100% Coinsurance: What It Means for 2014 and beyond.” Milliman. 24 June 2015. Web.
11 Jan. 2016.
Reinsurance Payment Calculation:
0,
𝑓(𝑥) = { (𝑥 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝐶,
(𝐵 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝐶,

𝑥≤𝐴
𝐴<𝑥≤𝐵
𝑥>𝐵

A sample reinsurance calculation for 2015 is provided below with the following
assumptions:


Total claims for an individual in a given year = $150,000



Attachment point = $45,000



Reinsurance cap = $250,000



Coinsurance rate = 50%

𝑓($150,000) = [($150,000 − $45,000) ∗ .50] = $52,500
In order to fund the transitional reinsurance program, $63 will be collected per
member per year in 2014 from “health insurance issuers and certain self-insured group
health plans offering major medical coverage that is part of a commercial book of
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business.” Also note that for the purpose of reinsurance contributions, major medical
coverage is defined as “a catastrophic plan, an individual or a small group market plan
subject to the actuarial value requirements under 45 CFR (Code of Federal
Regulations) 156.140, or health coverage for a broad range of services and treatments
provided in various settings that provides minimum value as defined in 45 CFR
156.145” (“The Transitional Reinsurance Program - Reinsurance Contributions”). This
means that while reinsurance payments are only made to claims in the individual
market, contributions will come from major medical plans from the individual, small
group, and large group markets and self-funded group major medical plans. A full
breakdown of businesses required and not required to fund the federal reinsurance
program is represented in Table 3 below (Cigna).
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Table 3
Reinsurance Contributions
Reinsurance Fee
Business affected
·

Insured individual and group major medical plans

·

Self-funded group major medical plans

·

Taft-Hartley Plans to the extent the plans meet other criteria for inclusion

·
Group retiree medical plans covering individuals who are not eligible for Medicare or for whom
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaMedicare is the secondary player
o

(includes active employees age 65+ and pre-65 retirees)

·

Medical Plans that are integrated with a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA)

·

Short-Term Abroad (STA) expatriate plans

·

Self-funded expatriate plans (in 2014 only)

Business excluded
·

Standalone pharmacy and behavioral health plans

·

Standalone dental and vision plans

·

Hospital indemnity and specified disease plans

·

Private Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, state and federal high-risk pools and basic health plans

·

Coverage for post-65 retirees and disabled individuals where Medicare is the primary payer

·

Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)

·

Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs)

·

Employee Assistance Plans (EAPs), disease management programs and wellness programs

·

Stop-loss and indemnity reinsurance policies

·

Military health benefits

·

Indian Health Service Coverage

·

Insured expatriate coverage

·

Self-funded expatriate plans (in 2015 and 2016)

Source: Cigna. “Reinsurance Fact Sheet.” (2015): Web. 11 Jan. 2016.
Risk Adjustment
Risk adjustment is likely to be the most significant topic of discussion for
actuaries working in the post-ACA marketplace. Unlike reinsurance and risk corridors,
risk adjustment will persist indefinitely beyond 2016. The concept of risk adjustment is
fairly simple, but the implementation of this risk-sharing mechanism is complicated.
Essentially risk adjustment “redistributes funds from plans with lower-risk enrollees to
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plans with higher-risk enrollees” for non-grandfathered plans in the individual and small
group markets (“Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and
Risk Corridors”). The intent is to have plans that are priced based on the market
average risk, as opposed the risk of their prospective enrollees. This proposition
becomes challenging when examining the means by which the risk adjustment transfer
payments are calculated. Below is the risk adjustment transfer formula which “averages
all individual risk scores in a risk adjustment covered plan, makes certain adjustments,
and calculates the funds transferred between plans” (Kautter). The details of these
certain adjustments and their implications are discussed in the following paragraphs.

𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑖 : Allowable rating factor
𝐴𝑉𝑖 : Actuarial value of plan i’s metal
level
𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖 : Geographic cost factor
𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑖 : Induced demand factor
𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖 : Plan liability risk score

𝑃s: statewide market average plan
premium
𝑠𝑖 : plan’s share of marketwide
enrollment
𝑇𝑖 : Transfer amount

In order to better understand the formula, it is critical to begin with the CMS’s
given definitions of the variables used. The plan liability risk score reflects “a plan’s
actuarial value as well as the plan’s enrollee health status risk (including health risk due
to age),” and is calculated using the CMS-HCC model. This will be discussed further in
the next section. The induced demand factor reflects “the anticipated induced demand
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associated with the plan’s (metal) level.” Put another way, an insurer would expect that
with richer benefits, they would see higher utilization of these benefits. For example, if
one plan had comparably cheaper copayments versus another, one might expect the
enrollee to use the benefits more often. Therefore, this induced demand factor might be
greater for a gold plan than a bronze plan. The geographic cost factor “reflects the
medical cost structure in the geographic location of the plan’s enrollees.” The allowable
rating factor “reflects the impact of the age composition of each plan’s enrollees on the
premiums it would collect from enrollees.” Actuarial value was defined previously as a
means of measuring benefit richness represented as a percentage of the “average
share of medical spending” paid by the plan (Pope et al.). The remaining variables
(statewide market average plan premium, plan’s share of marketwide enrollment, and
transfer amount) are self-explanatory.
For the purposes of this analysis, the focus will be specifically on interpreting the
intent of this formula and how it practically alters traditional actuarial pricing
considerations. Firstly, there exists significant unknowns in the above formula: ∑𝑖 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖
and 𝑠𝑖 . The first unknown (∑𝑖 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖 ) represents the sum of the marketwide plan liability
risk scores, and the second unknown (𝑠𝑖 ) represents the plan’s share of marketwide
enrollment. While an actuary may be able to estimate their own company’s plan liability
risk score using the HHS-HCC risk adjustment model, it will be significantly more
challenging for them to estimate the plan liability risks scores of their competitors.
Milliman actuaries Mary van der Heijde and Jordan Paulus state that, “It is difficult – if
not impossible—to estimate risk transfer payments based on a carrier’s risk score
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alone” (Van der Heijde, Paulus). Similarly, a plan’s market share changes from year to
year and is also impacted by the other plans offered by the insurer and its competitors.
The goals of the risk adjustment program as described by the CMS were to
provide “payments to health insurance issuers that attract high-risk enrollees, such as
those with chronic conditions,” reduce “the incentives for issuers to avoid those
enrollees,” and lessen “the potential influence of risk selection on the premiums that
plans charge” (“Summary Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and
Permanent Risk Adjustment Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). As a result, actuaries
have to seriously consider how their enrollees compare with the rest of the market and
how their insurer’s plan designs and corresponding premiums may impact the
composition of their enrollees. For example, assume that in the state of Washington a
particular insurer offered the cheapest gold plan in the individual market. As a result,
they may gain a large share of business from individuals looking for budget gold tier
plans, but this demographic may be different than that of another more expensive gold
tier plan offered by another insurer. As a result, the plan liability risk score for this
cheaper gold plan would vary from other gold plans in the market.
Consider another situation where an insurer focuses its marketing heavily on
young healthy adults. In the past, this was more common practice as insurers benefitted
heavily from having healthier enrollees. Now in the post-ACA market insurers have to
consider whether having a higher proportion of healthier individuals is actually
financially beneficial, as they may forfeit profits if their plan liability risk scores are
significantly lower than the market average. The ultimate intent here is to display how
this implementation of risk adjustment has dramatically altered the mindset of traditional
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actuarial practices. No longer can actuaries focus primarily on planning for the risk
profile of their typical demographic of enrollees. They must also direct their gaze
towards the rest of the market and ensure that their plans and pricing do not place them
in an unfavorable position when it comes time to submit their insurer’s claims data for
risk adjustment.
The HHS-HCC Risk Adjustment Model
The Department of Health and Human Services Hierarchical Condition
Categories risk adjustment model (abbreviated HHS-HCC) is used in the ACA’s risk
adjustment provision to evaluate the plan liability risk scores for insurers in the individual
and small group markets. A risk adjustment model (merely one factor in the risk
adjustment transfer payment formula discussed above) “uses an individual’s
demographics and diagnoses to determine a risk score, which is a relative measure of
how costly that individual is anticipated to be” (Kautter).
The CMS-HCC risk adjustment model (which has been used in the past for risk
adjusting Medicare Advantage plans) was the basis for the HHS-HCC risk adjustment
model. Changes were then made to reflect the different conditions existing in the
individual and small group markets post-ACA versus the Medicare Advantage market.
Notably, since Medicare populations were used in developing the CMS-HCC model,
adjustments needed to be made to reflect a demographic consisting of more than
seniors and disabled individuals. Additionally, the sample size for certain diagnoses (i.e.
pregnancy or neonatal complications) in the Medicare population are quite low when
compared with the commercially insured population. A final change relates to the type of
medical spending that is reflected in the risk score. The CMS hierarchical condition

George 19
categories “are configured to predict non-drug medical spending” while the HHS-HCCs
“are configured to predict the sum of medical and drug spending” (Kautter).
This leads into one of the greatest challenges associated with risk adjustment
models. According to Milliman, “perfect risk adjustment” would result in a market where
“insurance carriers would theoretically be indifferent to “risk” associated with the
members they enroll” (Leida, Katterman). In order for the risk adjustment program to be
successful, the risk adjustment mechanism must be able to accurately reflect cost
differences associated with different demographics and risk scores. It must
simultaneously protect insurers with high-risk enrollees and reduce financial incentives
for insurers trying to target a particular demographic with lower associated claims costs.
The resulting challenge for risk adjusters is creating a model that can predict current
medical claims costs. However, as a result of constant changes occurring in the
healthcare field due to factors such as fluctuations in the price of prescription drugs, the
creation of new prescription drugs, advances in medical technology, and others, the
model needs to be frequently reevaluated.
Another concern for insurers and their actuaries relates to the importance of
coding. Because risk scores are based on the diagnosis codes for an enrollee in the
given year, “timely coding and processing of claims is important to ensure that all
conditions are flagged by April of the following calendar year” (Van der Heijde, Paulus).
In order to maximize profits/minimize losses from risk adjustment, accurate and detailed
coding is essential, and could make a considerable difference when the government
calculates the risk adjustment transfer payments. Therefore, differences in the
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thoroughness and precision of coding from one insurer to the next can have profound
impacts on the risk adjustment transfer payments.
Risk Corridors
The third component of the 3 R’s is risk corridors, and applies to individual and
small group qualified health plans from 2014-2016. The specific goal of the risk
corridors provision is to protect health insurers against the “pricing uncertainty of their
plans” in the post-ACA marketplace by “temporarily dampening gains and losses in a
risk-sharing arrangement between issuers and the federal government.” Risk corridor
payments are calculated by comparing “allowable costs” to a “target amount.” Allowable
costs consist of claims costs plus certain adjustments including reinsurance, risk
adjustment, and health information technology costs. The target amount consists of
premiums minus allowable administrative costs. The allowable administrative (nonclaim) costs do allow a certain margin for profit. The ratio of allowable costs to target
costs dictates whether the insurer will owe or be owed a risk corridor payment. The
table below (Table 4) illustrates how the fee or reimbursement is calculated, where x is
equal to the allowable costs over the target costs (Norris, Van der Heijde, Leida).
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Table 4
Risk Corridor Calculations
Allowable Costs/Target Costs

Result

0.92>xaaaaa

80% Fee

0.92<x<0.97

50% Fee

0.97<x<1 aa

No Fee

Wa1<x<1.03

No Reimbursement

l1.03<x<1.08

50% Reimbursement

aaaaax>1.08

80% Reimbursement

Source: Norris, Doug, Mary van der Heijde, and Hans Leida. “Risk Corridors Under the
Affordable Care Act.” SOA Health Watch 73 (2013): 5–10. Print.
When interpreting the above table, note that if the ratio of allowable costs to
target costs is greater than one, the premium collected was less than required, and if
the ratio is less than one, then the premium collected was more than required. The
above table results in three potential situations. If a given plan’s ratio of allowable costs
over target costs is within 1±0.03, the plan does not pay any fees or receive any
reimbursement. For the next five percentage points (i.e. 0.92-0.97 or 1.03-1.08), the
gains or losses are split 50/50 between the insurer and the government. Lastly, for any
gains or losses beyond those points (i.e. <0.92 or >1.08), the plan keeps either 20% of
the gains or is reimbursed 80% of the losses.
Ignoring for a moment the complexity inherent in the risk corridors formula, there
exist other considerations for actuaries and insurers regarding this provision. As
illustrated above, the risk corridors program is symmetric and two-sided. Originally, this
provision of the ACA was not required to be budget neutral, meaning that risk corridor
payments did not have to equal risk corridor reimbursements. In late 2014, the passing
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of the Cromnibus bill required that “2014 risk corridor receivables paid in 2015 be
funded through payables into the program from other insurers.” An announcement from
the CMS on October 1st of 2015 revealed what “many industry analysts foresaw”:
severe underfunding of the program. Insurers can now expect to receive a mere 12.6%
of their 2014 risk corridor receivables in 2015. This leads to concerns regarding
potential 2015 and 2016 receivables because those insurers that were underfunded for
2014 will be first in line to collect payments in later years (assuming the funds are
available) (Katterman).
Before leaving the subject of risk corridors, it is important to consider what
caused this funding shortfall. Milliman actuary Scott Katterman proposes a number of
potential causes in his article titled “Headwinds cause 2014 risk corridor funding
shortfall.” The most notable of these proposed causes relates to the reality that the
health insurance market favors plans in a risk corridors receivables position. Katterman
states that, “all else being equal, lower-priced plans are more likely to be in a risk
corridor receivables position while higher-priced plans are more likely to be in a
payables position.” Assuming equivalent benefits, lower-priced plans generally result in
greater enrollment when compared to higher-priced plans. Therefore, the market will
have a higher concentration of enrollment in the lower-priced plans when compared with
higher-priced plans, and these lower-priced plans are more likely to be in a receivables
position because of the lower premiums. Additionally, had it not been for the changes to
reinsurance for 2014 (decreased attachment point and increased coinsurance rate), the
risk corridors program would have been in an even less favorable position (Katterman).
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Conclusion of ACA Changes
Healthcare consumers have immediately felt the impacts of specific aspects of
the ACA including guaranteed issue, the family 3-child cap, and the creation of the
health insurance marketplace. Meanwhile, the new legislation has necessitated many
changes in regards to actuaries’ work in the health insurance industry. Actuaries have
been further incentivized to perform market analyses in order to best manage the risks
of their employers in 2014 and beyond, and must consider a variety of new factors in
addition to the risk profiles of their target demographic. It has also been demonstrated
how this new legislation has imposed restrictions on how actuaries can price their plans.
The above topics will be considered heavily when performing the following analysis
regarding the changes necessitated by the post-ACA marketplace.

Rating Restrictions Analysis
The following pages will consist of a statistical analysis comparing changes in the
relative pricing of health insurance premiums in 2013 versus 2014. The data for the
following analysis was provided to me by the Washington State Office of the Insurance
Commissioner (Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner Health
Insurance Rate Filing Database). This government office is, among other things,
responsible for reviewing all health insurance rate filings and ensuring that an insurer’s
rates are actuarially sound and work within the established legislation governing health
insurance plans. The dataset is complete, meaning that my analysis was conducted
using every premium from every insurer in Washington in 2013 and 2014. Note that the
insurer Moda was formerly known as ODS. They are treated as the same company for
the purpose of comparing data from 2013 and 2014. For the following tables, an “N/A” in
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the 2013 column indicates the insurer was not a part of the Washington individual
market in 2013. The “SD” column will present the corresponding standard deviation of
the average ratio or factor. In total, rates were gathered from 14 different insurers with a
sum of 92 plans in 2013 and 95 plans in 2014.
As detailed previously, 2014 brought about age-related pricing restrictions
(known as age bands) and tobacco usage related rating restrictions. As a reminder,
recall that the ACA age bands required that the ratio of health insurance premiums for
children (defined as individuals aged 0-20) versus adults aged 21 is 0.635:1. The ACA
also requires the ratio of health insurance premiums for individuals aged 64 and older
versus individuals aged 21 to be 3:1. Finally, the ACA has required that the ratio of
health insurance premiums for tobacco versus non-tobacco using individuals of the
same age to be no greater than 1.5:1.
In order to quantify the significance of these restrictions, the health insurance
premiums from 2013 and 2014 in the Washington individual market were compiled
through the aforementioned source. After compiling and organizing the rates, the
following three statistics were calculated and reformatted as tables: the average ratio of
premiums for children versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 and 2014 (Table 5), the
average ratio of premiums for individuals aged 64 and older versus individuals aged 21
in 2013 and 2014 (Table 6), and the average tobacco rating factor for 2013 and 2014
(Table 7).
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Table 5
Average ratio of premiums for children versus individuals aged 21
Insurer
Asuris
BridgeSpan
Community Health Plan of Washington
Coordinated Care Washington
Group Health Cooperative
Group Health Options, Inc.
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW
LifeWise Health Plan of WA
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS)
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc.
Premera Blue Cross
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon
Regence Blue Shield
Time Insurance Company

Number of Plans
2013
2014
13
6
N/A
3
N/A
3
N/A
3
8
7
8
3
20
13
6
15
14
2
N/A
2
1
23
9
6
13
6
N/A
3

2013
Average Ratio
1.000
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.766
0.741
1.000
0.836
0.833
N/A
0.757
1.000
1.000
N/A

SD
0.000
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.093
0.094
0.000
0.015
0.007
N/A
0.000
0.000
0.000
N/A

2014
Average Ratio
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635
0.635

SD
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

The above table (Table 5) serves to compare the average ratio of premiums for
children versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 versus 2014. The 2013 values were
calculated using a two-step process. Firstly, the premium for children was divided by the
premium for adults aged 21 for each individual plan in an insurer’s portfolio. Then, these
ratios were summed and divided by the total of number of plans offered by the given
insurer. The identical 2014 ratios are a result of the government-mandated age bands.
Also, we see high standard deviations for the 2013 plans offered by both Group Health
Cooperative and Group Health Options. In looking at the data in more detail, both
insurers offered two plans with low out-of-pocket maximums that generated ratios which
did not align with the rest of their plans. Both insurers have similarly high standard
deviations for the 2013 statistics in the below tables as well. Moving on, we see that no
insurer in 2013 had a ratio even within 0.1 of the required ratio in 2014. In fact, four of
the ten insurers that participated in the 2013 individual market offered the exact same
rate to children and adults aged 21. This indicates that in the 2014 Washington
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individual market, the health insurance premiums for children have decreased relative to
the premiums for adults aged 21.
Table 6
Average ratio of premiums for individuals aged 64 and older versus 21
2013
Non-Smoker
Insurer
Number of Plans Average Ratio
SD
Asuris
13
3.666
0.011
BridgeSpan
N/A
N/A
N/A
Community Health Plan of Washington
N/A
N/A
N/A
Coordinated Care Washington
N/A
N/A
N/A
Group Health Cooperative
8
3.339
0.391
Group Health Options, Inc.
8
3.326
0.384
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW
20
3.745
0.005
LifeWise Health Plan of WA
6
3.732
0.030
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS)
14
3.722
0.022
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc.
N/A
N/A
N/A
Premera Blue Cross
1
3.440
0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon
9
3.672
0.007
Regence Blue Shield
13
3.669
0.009
Time Insurance Company
N/A
N/A
N/A

Smoker
Average Ratio
3.668
N/A
N/A
N/A
3.341
3.334
3.746
3.711
3.716
N/A
3.446
3.663
3.669
N/A

SD
0.008
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.398
0.393
0.004
0.019
0.022
N/A
0.000
0.007
0.012
N/A

Smoker
Average Ratio
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000

SD
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

2014
Non-Smoker
Insurer
Number of Plans Average Ratio
SD
Asuris
6
3.000
0.000
BridgeSpan
3
3.000
0.000
Community Health Plan of Washington
3
3.000
0.000
Coordinated Care Washington
3
3.000
0.000
Group Health Cooperative
7
3.000
0.000
Group Health Options, Inc.
3
3.000
0.000
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW
13
3.000
0.000
LifeWise Health Plan of WA
15
3.000
0.000
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS)
2
3.000
0.000
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc.
2
3.000
0.000
Premera Blue Cross
23
3.000
0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon
6
3.000
0.000
Regence Blue Shield
6
3.000
0.000
Time Insurance Company
3
3.000
0.000

The above table (Table 6) serves to compare the average ratio of premiums for
individuals aged 64 and older versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 and 2014. This
calculation was performed by the exact same method as described above, except in this
case the premium for individuals aged 64 and older was divided by the premium for
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individuals aged 21. We again can note a change in this comparison where every single
insurer in the Washington 2013 individual market was required to make significant
changes to their pricing of insurance premiums in 2014. We see ratios in 2013 as low as
3.326 and as high as 3.746. This indicates that in 2014 health insurance premiums for
individuals aged 64 and older were less costly relative to premiums for individuals aged
21 than in the previous year. The above two tables could be collectively interpreted to
illustrate how a greater proportion of health insurance premiums has fallen on
individuals aged 21 than in years past. Both the oldest and youngest enrollees have
seen their premiums decrease relative to individuals aged 21. This could be good news
for both enrollees with children and older individuals, while individuals aged 21-24 (who
occupy identical age bands with a factor of 1) have seen their premiums increase
relative to other demographics. From an actuary’s perspective, this is certainly limiting
as it is possible (if not likely) that given the previous year’s ratios, the age bands have
created a situation in which the relative premiums are not reflective of the actual change
in costs associated with different ages.
Table 7
Average Tobacco Rating Factor
Insurer
Asuris
BridgeSpan
Community Health Plan of Washington
Coordinated Care Washington
Group Health Cooperative
Group Health Options, Inc.
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW
LifeWise Health Plan of WA
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS)
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc.
Premera Blue Cross
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon
Regence Blue Shield
Time Insurance Company

Number of Plans
2013
2013
2014 Average Factor
13
6
1.147
N/A
3
N/A
N/A
3
N/A
N/A
3
N/A
8
7
1.193
8
3
1.194
20
13
1.208
6
15
1.162
14
2
1.162
N/A
2
N/A
1
23
1.158
9
6
1.147
13
6
1.147
N/A
3
N/A

SD
0.022
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.031
0.031
0.010
0.027
0.024
N/A
0.024
0.022
0.022
N/A

2014
Average Factor
1.150
1.150
1.000
1.000
1.200
1.200
1.200
1.075
1.000
1.000
1.075
1.150
1.150
1.200

SD
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Lastly, we come to the table comparing the average smoking factor in 2013
versus 2014 (Table 7). This calculation was a two-step process. Firstly, the premium for
a tobacco user was divided by the premium for a non-tobacco user for every age of
every plan in an insurer’s portfolio. Then the average of these ratios was computed.
Effectively, this means the average consisted of 45 ratios multiplied by the number of
plans offered by the insurer. For example, LifeWise offered six plans in 2013, so the
number of ratios used in calculating the average was 6*45, or 270. This 45 comes from
adding the one age band spanning years 0-20, 43 separate age bands for individuals
aged 21-63, and the final age band for individuals 64 and older.
Recall that the ACA implemented a cap of 1.5 for this tobacco user rating factor.
The above table indicates that in Washington no insurer was anywhere near reaching
that limitation, and with the exception of Moda, insurers did not change their tobacco
rating factor by more than 0.01. As a purely speculative observation, it is possible that
Moda and the three other insurers with a 1.0 tobacco rating factor have attempted to
strategically target the population of tobacco users by making it such that their rates for
tobacco users and non-tobacco users are the same. The ultimate conclusion from this
table is that in the Washington individual market, the tobacco rating restriction has had
no limiting effect on health insurance pricing.
Conclusion of Analysis
The above tables quantitatively demonstrate how the Affordable Care Act altered
the actuarial pricing of medical insurance in the Washington individual market. The age
bands were particularly restrictive, forcing every single insurer to make significant
changes to their relative premiums. It was noted how these restrictions have effectively
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placed a greater burden on individuals aged 21 versus children and seniors. This is
particularly enlightening, as this design reflects the intent of the healthcare reform. In
the past, actuaries primarily focused on pricing to the risks associated with their current
and target demographics, but now these age-related rating restrictions have
necessitated a redistribution of the burden of the costs of healthcare. On the other hand,
there is little to no evidence that the tobacco rating restriction had any meaningful effect
on the 2014 Washington individual market.

Final Thoughts
The purpose of this thesis was twofold. Firstly, the key provisions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act were examined in order to better understand how
the pricing considerations of health actuaries and the consumers of healthcare were
affected. These changes specifically included guaranteed issue, the family 3-child cap
for individual market rating, the health insurance marketplace, actuarial value, essential
health benefits, age bands and tobacco usage, reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk
corridors. It has been illustrated how both individually and together these changes have
significant implications for actuaries working to price health insurance in the individual
and small group markets.
Secondly, a statistical analysis was conducted in an effort to quantify the
significance of specific age and tobacco related rating restrictions in the Washington
individual market. It was found that the age bands were the most significant restrictor,
while the tobacco rating restriction had no discernible impact on rating. Furthermore, the
data demonstrated the intent behind the design of the healthcare reform, and the
effective redistribution of costs on young adults.
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Unquestionably, there exists a great number of questions related to healthcare
reform that are yet to be answered, and countless statistical analyses are currently
being performed by actuaries to quantify the risks associated with these changes.
Certain demographics will undeniably benefit from this recent healthcare reform,
particularly those who were denied coverage because of preexisting conditions.
Insurers and actuaries have, in turn, seen the complexity of their work dramatically
increase. Profit margins will be further restricted by risk adjustment and risk corridors,
and the number of pricing considerations for their actuaries has significantly increased.
Only time will tell the stability and sustainability of this new system, but without question,
the demand for health actuaries has increased, and their roles have become
increasingly complicated.
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